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Repeated games with incomplete information on one side
Marcin P ˛ eski
Department of Economics, University of Chicago
This paper studies repeated games with incomplete information on one side and
equal discount factors for both players. The payoffs of the informed player I de-
pend on one of two possible states of the world, which is known to her. The pay-
offs of the uninformed player U do not depend on the state of the world (that is, U
knowshispayoffs),butplayerI’sbehaviormakesknowledgeofthestateofinterest
to player U. We deﬁne a ﬁnitely revealing equilibrium as a Bayesian perfect equi-
librium where player I reveals information in a bounded number of periods. We
deﬁne an ICR proﬁle as a strategy proﬁle in which (a) after each history the play-
ers have individually rational payoffs and (b) no type of player I wants to mimic
the behavior of the other type. We show that when the players are patient, all
Nash equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game can be approximated by payoffs
in ﬁnitely revealing equilibria, which themselves approximate the set of all ICR
payoffs. We provide a geometric characterization of the set of equilibrium pay-
offs, which can be used for computations.
Keywords. Repeated games, incomplete information, discounting.
JEL classification. C73.
1. Introduction
Many strategic situations involve long-run interactions in which there is uncertainty
about payoffs. Aumann and Maschler (1995) (written 1966–68) introduce repeated
games with incomplete information to model such situations. There are two players.
The informed player (player I, she) knows which of two states of the world is true; the
uninformed player (U, he) starts the repeated interaction with prior beliefs. Player I’s,
but not player U’s, stage-game payoffs depend on the state of the world. It was under-
stood very early that this model leads to novel strategic issues that cannot be adequately
analyzed by focusing separately on either the uncertainty or the long-run aspect. These
issues include questions of learning, strategic revelation of information, and reputation
effects.
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Asaﬁrststeptowardacompleteanalysisofequilibriumbehavior,onemayaskabout
equilibrium payoffs. This is the goal of the current paper. Suppose that the two players
discountthefuturewiththesamediscountfactor,andthatthestage-gamepayoffssat-
isfy a certain full-dimensionality condition. Then, if the players are sufﬁciently patient,
all feasible payoffs that satisfy appropriate individual rationality and incentive compat-
ibility conditions can be approximated by payoffs in sequential equilibria. The main
result provides a geometric characterization for the whole correspondence of payoff sets
for each initial prior.
The analysis is divided into three parts. The ﬁrst part characterizes a lower bound
on the set of payoffs in a simple subclass of ﬁnitely revealing equilibria. The second
part constructs an upper bound on the set of payoffs in proﬁles that satisfy both incen-
tive compatibility and individual rationality. The third part shows that these bounds are
equal. Speciﬁcally, when players are patient, any payoff in a proﬁle that satisﬁes the
incentive compatibility and individual rationality conditions can be approximated by
payoffs in Nash equilibria; furthermore, any payoff in a Nash equilibrium can be ap-
proximated by payoffs in ﬁnitely revealing equilibria. As a by-product of the proof, I ob-
tain a geometric characterization of the equilibrium correspondence that can be used
in applications.
The full-dimensionality condition implies that there is an open set of player I’s pay-
offssuchthatforanydegeneratepriorp 2f0,1g,anypayoffof I isattainedinsomeequi-
librium. The assumption allows for ﬂexibility in choosing continuation payoffs, and its
role and strength are comparable to the standard requirement in the folk theorem lit-
erature of a feasible payoff set with a non-empty interior (for example, Fudenberg et al.
1994).
I now describe the characterization in more detail. The major difﬁculty with re-
peatedgameswithincompleteinformationistheirlackofstationarity. Thestagepayoffs
of player U depend on his beliefs, which change throughout the game. Some station-
arity can be restored by focusing on ﬁnitely revealing equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which
player I revealsinformationinﬁnitelymanyperiods. Duringperiodswhenplayer I does
not reveal information, the prior belief of playerU does not change, and payoffs can be
analyzed through the methods of dynamic programming from the literature on games
with imperfect monitoring (see Abreu et al. 1990 and Fudenberg et al. 1994). Section 3
describes the lower bound on payoffs in ﬁnitely revealing equilibria, assuming full di-
mensionality; this in turn forms a lower bound on the set of payoffs in all equilibria. The
main result shows that these two bounds are equal.
The reader might ﬁnd such a result intuitive. In any equilibrium, the belief of player
U is a martingale, and thus converges. This means that, with high probability, substan-
tial amounts of information are revealed only ﬁnitely many times, and thus any equilib-
rium is “approximately” ﬁnitely revealing. However, this intuition does not easily turn
into a proof, and in fact fails utterly in the no-discounting case, in which examples of
equilibrium payoffs that cannot be approximated by ﬁnitely revealing proﬁles are well-
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AnICRproﬁle isany(potentiallymixed)strategyproﬁlethatsatisﬁestwoconditions:
IR The continuation payoffs of each player after each history are individually rational.
IC Each type of player I is indifferent between playing any pure strategy in the sup-
port of her own mixed strategy and weakly prefers any such strategy to any pure
strategy in the support of the other type’s mixed strategy.
The incentive compatibility condition IC ensures that neither type of player I wants
to mimic the other. Any equilibrium proﬁle is necessarily an ICR proﬁle, but not the
reverse; in an ICR proﬁle, playerU is not required to best-respond to player I, and there
mightbeproﬁtabledeviationsforsometypeofplayer I notinthesupportof I’sstrategy.
Section4characterizestheupperboundonthesetofICRproﬁles. Thischaracteriza-
tionisrelatedtoanideainFudenbergandLevine(1994), whoshowthattheequilibrium
payoffs in a game with complete information (but imperfect monitoring) cannot lie be-
yond a certain hyperplane. Here one could try to use hyperplanes to bound payoffs in a
game that starts with some ﬁxed prior p. However, in order to obtain a tight bound, one
needs to control payoffs across all games starting with any prior p 2 [0,1] at the same
time. For this purpose, I use biafﬁne functions, i.e., functions that are afﬁne in the prior
and payoffs separately. Biafﬁne functions are introduced in Aumann and Hart (1986) to
study bimartingales, which are useful in games with no discounting.
The lower and upper bounds are stated as correspondences that assign payoff sets
to prior beliefs p 2[0,1]. Characterizations in Sections 3 and 4 derive two classes of geo-
metric constraints on the inﬁnitesimal changes in payoffs with respect to the inﬁnitesi-
mal changes in prior beliefs. These constraints are different, but related. Using a certain
“differential technique,” I show that they can be satisﬁed by only one correspondence.
1.1 Related literature
The characterization of equilibrium payoffs is the goal of a large part of the repeated
games literature. This ﬁeld originated with Aumann et al. (1966–68) and initially con-
centrated on the no-discounting criterion. In that model, Hart (1985) shows that all
feasible and individually rational payoffs that satisfy the incentive compatibility condi-
tion can be obtained in an equilibrium. Shalev (1994) and Koren (1992) present sharper
results in the case of known own payoffs, where playerU’s payoffs do not depend on the
state of the world.
So far, there have been no analogous results for games with discounting. The most
advanced analysis, found in Cripps and Thomas (2003), looks at the limit correspon-
dence of payoffs when the probability of one of the types is close to 1.1 It is shown
there that the set of payoffs of player U and the high probability type are close to the
folk theorem payoffs in a complete information game. Cripps and Thomas (1997) and
Chan (2000) ask the same question within the framework of reputation games. All these
results are proved by the construction of ﬁnitely revealing equilibria.
1Cripps and Thomas (2003) discuss also the limit of payoff sets when the two players become inﬁnitely
patient, but player I becomes patient much more quickly than does player U. Their characterization is
closely related to Shalev and Koren’s results for the no-discounting case.32 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
ThispaperextendsHart’sresulttodiscountinginthespecialcaseoftwostatesofthe
worldandknownownpayoffs. Themainresultindicatesacuriousrelationshipbetween
incomplete information and long-run payoff criteria. In games with complete informa-
tion, the sets of equilibrium payoffs in the no-discounting and discounting cases are
equal, i.e., the folk theorem characterizations of Rubinstein (1979) and Fudenberg and
Maskin (1986) coincide. Under incomplete information, the difference between the two
casesisnon-trivial: thesetofequilibriumpayoffsintheno-discountingcaseisincluded
(typically strictly) in the set of equilibrium payoffs in the discounted case. Section 2.11
explainsthisdifferencebycomparingthemeaningofindividualrationalityineachcase.
Cripps et al. (2005) study reputation effects in games with strictly conﬂicting inter-
ests. They provide an upper bound on the payoffs of player U and the normal type of
player I. Although the authors do not state it in this way, their methods are very closely
related to the derivation of the upper bound on ICR payoffs in the current paper. (Note
that reputation games do not satisfy the full-dimensionality assumption; however, this
assumption is not necessary for the upper bound on ICR payoffs.) In fact, biafﬁne func-
tions lead to a simple argument for reputational effects, and they can be used to show
that these effects are continuous with respect to games that have only close to strictly
conﬂicting interests.
2. Model and main result
This section introduces the model and deﬁnitions, then states the main result.
2.1 Notation
For any v 2 RK, let kvk be the Euclidean length of v. Let d  Rd be a set of all unitary
vectors in Rd: d = f 2 Rd : kk = 1g. Let d
+  d be the subset of vectors with
nonnegative coordinates: d
+ = f : k  0g. I use the following set operators. For any
set A, let A denote the set of probability distributions on A. For any A R3,
 intA denotes the interior of A (the largest open set contained in A)
 clA denotes the closure of A (the smallest closed set containing A)
 projA denotes the projection of A on its last two coordinates:
projA =f(v0,v1):there is vU such that (vU,v0,v1)2Ag
 conA denotes the convexiﬁcation of A (the smallest convex set containing A).
2.2 Repeated game
Two players, uninformed U and informed I, repeatedly play a stage game. There are
ﬁnite sets of pure actionsSU for playerU andSI for player I. Player I knows the state of
the world k 2f0,1g. I say that k is a type of player I and write  k =1 k. Player I’s pay-
offsinthestagegamedependonthestateoftheworldandaregivenby gk :SU SI !R.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Repeated games with incomplete information 33
Player U’s payoffs do not depend on the state of the world (known-payoff case) and are






Players have access to a public randomization device (this assumption is for conve-
nience only and can be dropped using standard arguments). Let Ht = (SU SI [0,1])t
be the space of t-period histories of actions and public signals. A (behavior) strategy of
player U is a mapping U : [tHt ! SU. A (behavior) strategy of player I of type k is a
mapping k :[tHt !SU. A strategy proﬁle is a triple  =(U,0,1).
Future payoffs are discounted by the factor  < 1, the same for each player. Let
 (p,)denotethegamewithinitialpriorp anddiscountfactor. Letvk(U,k)denote
therepeatedgamepayoffoftypek whenplayerU usesthestrategyU andplayer I uses
k. Let vU(U,k) denote the payoff of playerU facing type k. The expected payoff of
player U in the game with initial prior p is equal to pvU(U,1) + (1   p)vU(U,0).







A strategy proﬁle  = (U,0,1) is a Nash equilibrium if U is a best response for
player U and k (k = 0, 1) is a best response for type k of player I. Denote the set of
Nash equilibrium payoffs in the game  (p,) by
NE(p)=

vp(): is a Nash equilibrium
	
.









The correspondence NE describes the largest reasonable deﬁnition of the limit set of
equilibrium payoffs as  !1. Notice that NE is necessarily closed and can be treated as
an upper hemi-continuous correspondence NE:[0,1]R3.
2.4 Finitely revealing equilibria
An updating rule is a mapping p : [Ht ! [0,1], such that p(?) = p. The rule p is con-
sistent with  if, given any history ht, beliefs are updated via Bayes’ formula after any
action at 2 SI such that k(ht)(at) > 0 for some k = 0,1. The rule p is SR-consistent
(consistent with support restriction) if, additionally, U’s beliefs never change after any
history along which player I has already fully revealed her type (if p(ht) 2 f0,1g then
p(ht,hs)=p(ht) for any continuation history (ht,hs)).2 A proﬁle  is sequentially ratio-
nal given the updating rule p if, after any history ht, the continuation strategies are best
responses to the strategy of the opponent and beliefs p(ht).
2Madrigal et al. (1987) discuss various support restrictions in equilibria of extensive form games.34 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Fix strategies 0, 1 of player I and an updating rule p. For any history ht, pe-
riod t is a period of revelation if (a) there is uncertainty about the types of player I
(p(ht) = 2 f0,1g) and (b) the types of player I play different (possibly mixed) actions at
period t (0(ht) 6= 1(ht)). Say that strategy I is K-revealing for some K if there is an
SR-consistent updating rule p such that for any t, along any history ht the number of
periods of revelation t 0 <t is not greater than K.
For example, if p0 2f0,1g, then the beliefs remain constant along any path (pt(ht)=
p0), and any proﬁle is 0-revealing. If there is initial uncertainty about the type of player
I (p0 = 2 f0,1g), then in any 0-revealing proﬁle , two types of player I play the same
strategy along any path. The payoff in a 0-revealing  belongs to the convex hull of the
stage-game payoffs when player I’s types play the same action:
vp()2V =con

(gU(aU,aI),g0(aU,aI),g1(aU,aI)):aU 2SU and aI 2SI
	
. (2)
The set V R3 is called a set of feasible non-revealing payoffs. Note for further reference
that V is spanned by ﬁnitely many vertices.
Ifplayer I followsa K-revealingstrategy,itdoesnot meanthatshewillstoprevealing
any information after K periods. In particular, a K-revealing strategy does not put any
bound on the occurrence of the last period of revelation. Also, a K-revealing strategy
does not require player I to reveal her information fully.
A proﬁle  = (U,0,1) is a K-revealing equilibrium if there is an updating rule
p that is SR-consistent with ,  is sequentially rational given p, and (0,1) is K-
revealing given p. Any K-revealing equilibrium satisﬁes the conditions for a sequential
equilibrium in Kreps and Wilson (1982).3 Denote the correspondence of payoffs in all





vp(): is a K-revealing equilibrium
	
.








The correspondence FE consists of all interior equilibrium payoffs in ﬁnitely revealing
equilibria for a sufﬁciently high discount factor . It is the smallest possible reasonable
deﬁnition of the limit set of ﬁnitely revealing equilibrium payoffs as  ! 1. (Note that
the deﬁnitions of NE and FE interchange intersection and union to obtain the largest
and the smallest reasonable deﬁnitions.)
2.5 Individual rationality
Let (U,0,1) be a Nash equilibrium proﬁle. The expected payoff of player U is not
smaller thanU’s minmax value; similarly, the weighted average of the expected payoffs
3Strictly speaking, it satisﬁes an appropriate extension of Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) conditions to games
with inﬁnitely many stages. See also the discussion in Mailath and Samuelson (2006).Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Repeated games with incomplete information 35













kgk(U,I) for any  22
+.
For example, let k 2 2
+ be such that k
k = 1 and k
 k = 0. Then mI(k) is the min-
max payoff of type k in the complete information repeated game between playerU and








Say that the proﬁle  satisﬁes ex ante individual rationality if vp() 2 IR. Let
vp(ht )(jht) denote the vector of expected continuation payoffs after the history ht
given the strategy proﬁle  and an SR-consistent updating rule p. The proﬁle  sat-
isﬁes the condition IR if
IR: vp(ht )(jht)2IR after any positive probability history ht (where positive probability
is with respect to the prior beliefs of playerU).
The condition IR requires that individual rationality hold not only ex ante but also
after any positive probability history. Of course, any equilibrium proﬁle satisﬁes IR.
2.6 Incentive compatibility
Say that the proﬁle  satisﬁes the condition IC if
IC: GiventhestrategyofplayerU,eachtypek of I isindifferentbetweenthepurestrate-
gies in the support of her own mixed strategy and weakly prefers any such pure
strategy to any pure strategy in the support of the mixed strategy of type  k.
If the proﬁle  satisﬁes IC, then
















Because of (4), if  satisﬁes the IC condition, then v
p
U()2 E F,IC(p). On the other hand,














Figure 1. The construction of E F,IC(0). The shaded areas correspond to payoffs that are individ-
ually rational for playerU (vU mU).
the IC condition when  is sufﬁciently high.4 For this reason, I refer to E F,IC as the
correspondence of feasible and incentive compatible payoffs.
Because the sets E F,IC(k), k = 0, 1 are important later, it is helpful to develop some
intuition into how they are constructed. Figure 1 presents the construction of the set
E F,IC(0). Theleft-handsideshowsanexampleofthesetofnon-revealingpayoffsV. The
solid line outlines the projection of V onto the payoffs of the player I types, projV; the
shadedareaisthesetofpayoffsof I thatareassociatedwithindividuallyrationalpayoffs





1, hence v = (v0
U,v0
0,v1




E F,IC(0). The right-hand side of Figure 1 presents projE F,IC(0) (solid line) and projfv 2
E F,IC(0) : vU  mUg (shaded area). In particular, because (v0
0,v0
1) belongs to the shaded
area on the left-hand side, (v0,v1) belongs to the shaded area on the right-hand side. On
the other hand, because (u 0
0,u 0
1) does not belong to the shaded area on the left-hand
side, (u0,u1) does not belong to the shaded area on the right-hand side.
2.7 ICR proﬁles
A strategy proﬁle  is an ICR proﬁle if it satisﬁes the IR and IC conditions. Note that
the continuation proﬁle of an ICR proﬁle after any positive probability history is also an
ICR proﬁle. Denote the set of payoffs in all ICR proﬁles in the game  (p,) and the limit













1. Fix any two actions a
0, a
1 2SI such that a
0 6=a























For sufﬁciently high , ˜ v k 2 V. Find strategy proﬁles k such that v k(k) = ˜ v k for k = 0,1. (Such proﬁles





0)=0, and (aU,a I)=1 for any aU and any a I 6=a
0. Then  satisﬁes the













Any equilibrium proﬁle is necessarily an ICR proﬁle, but not the reverse. In an ICR pro-
ﬁle, player U is not required to best-respond to player I, and there might be proﬁtable
deviations for each of the types of player I as long as they do not belong to the supports
of the mixed strategies of the two types.
2.8 Feasible, incentive compatible and ex ante individually rational payoffs
Let
Ep =IR\E F,IC(p). (6)
Here, Ep is the set of feasible, incentive compatible, and ex ante individually rational
payoffs. As a corollary to the previous sections, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. For any  <1 and any p 2[0,1], NE(p)ICR(p) Ep.
In general, the last inclusion is strict. This is because the IR condition requires in-
dividual rationality after any positive probability history, and that is, typically, more
restrictive than ex ante individual rationality. However, when the prior p = 0,1 is de-
generate, Proposition 1 in Section 3 shows that intEp  NE(p). In particular, Ep has a
non-empty interior if and only if NE(p) has a non-empty interior; in such a situation,
Ep =NE(k). (An analogous result holds in the no-discounting case; see Hart 1985.) 5
Figure 2 presents the steps in the construction of the sets Ek,k = 0,1. The left-hand
side presents the projections projE F,IC(k),k =0,1 on the sets of player I’s payoffs (com-
pare with Figure 1). The shaded areas correspond to player U’s individually rational
payoffs and the thick line bounds the payoffs that are individually rational for player I.
By deﬁnition, Ek is the set of these payoffs in E F,IC(k) that are individually rational for
the two players. The projections of the sets Ek are depicted as the shaded areas in the
central part of the ﬁgure.
2.9 Full-dimensionality
Assumption 1 (Full-dimensionality). proj intE0 \proj intE1 6=?.














Thus, the set of payoffs of player U and type k in the incomplete information game with degenerate prior
p = k is equal to the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs of players U and I in the complete
information game between player U and type k of player I. Not surprisingly, the above result implies the
















Figure 2. The construction of the sets E0 and E1. The thick lines delineate the sets of player
I’s individually rational payoffs. The shaded areas correspond to payoffs that are individually
rational for playerU (vU mU).
Seetheright-handsidegraphofFigure2. Full-dimensionalitysaysthattherearetwo
interior payoff vectors v0 2 intE0 and v1 2 intE1 such that the payoffs of each type of
player I are equal, v0
k = v1
k for k = 0,1. The assumption relates directly to the standard
requirementoffulldimensionalityfromthefolktheoremliterature(forexample,Fuden-
berg et al. 1994). The next result says that if one drops the “int” from the assumption,
then it is always satisﬁed. The role of the assumption is explained in Section 3.3.
Lemma 1. projE0 \projE1 6=?.
Proof. Foreachk,chooseapayoffvectorvk 2V thatmaximizesthepayoffoftypek of





U 2 SU be the minmax action of player U, i.e., the mixed action that guarantees








For k = 0,1, deﬁne u k = (vk
U,v0
0,v1
1). Because of (7), u k 2 E F,IC(k). I now check that



















Thus u k 2 Ek and (v0
0,v1
1)2projEk for k =0,1. This yields the lemma. Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Repeated games with incomplete information 39
2.10 Main result
So far, it is clear that FE  NE  ICR. The main result of this paper shows that the inclu-
sions can be replaced by equalities.
Theorem 1. If Assumption 1 holds, then
clFE=NE=ICR.
In other words, all Nash equilibrium payoffs can be approximated by payoffs in
ﬁnitely revealing equilibria, and the limit set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs is equal
to the limit set of payoffs in ICR proﬁles.
Theorem1isprovedinparts. Section3characterizesalowerboundFE clFE. Sec-
tion 4 characterizes an upper bound ICR  ICR. Section 5 shows that the two bounds
are equal. Assumption 1 is used in the ﬁrst and the third parts, but is not necessary for
the discussion of the upper bound in Section 4.
2.11 Individual rationality and the no-discounting case
It is useful to compare the main result to the no-discounting case. Formally, deﬁne the
payoffs as Banach limits of the ﬁnite period averages of stage-game payoffs (see Hart
1985). Nash equilibrium proﬁles are deﬁned in the standard way. Let NEnd(p)  R3
denote the set of payoffs in Nash equilibria. (An interested reader is encouraged to look
at the excellent survey of all related methods in Sorin 1999.)
Theorem 2 (Shalev 1994, Koren 1992). For any k =0,1,
NEnd(k)= Ek.









In particular, for any p 2(0,1)
projNEnd(p)=projE0 \projE1.
The theorem has a simple interpretation: any equilibrium payoff can be obtained
in a 1-revealing equilibrium in which player I immediately reveals all her information
and subsequently the players play the complete information game. It is shown below
(Proposition 4) that, if Assumption 1 holds, then
NEnd(p)clFENE.
Thus, the payoffs in the no-discounting case are contained in the set of payoffs in the
discounted case. Typically, the inclusion is strict.
The discrepancy between the two cases can be attributed to the restrictiveness of
individual rationality.6 Consider the following condition:
6I am grateful to Martin W. Cripps for suggesting this connection.40 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
IR-in-every-state: The proﬁle  satisﬁes IR and after any positive probability history ht,
vU(U,kjht)mU for any type k of player I.
This condition says that the continuation payoffs of playerU are individually ratio-
nal after all positive probability histories, conditional on each state of the world. In the
no-discounting case, the conditions IR and IR-in-every-state are equivalent. The intu-
ition behind this fact is very simple. If vnd
U (U,k) < mU < vnd
U (U, k), then the two
types of player I play substantially different mixed actions in inﬁnitely many periods.
Thus, player U learns the type of player I in ﬁnite time, with a probability arbitrarily
close to 1. Upon learning that player I has type k, playerU should play a best response,
whichguaranteeshimapayoffofatleastmU. Sincethepayoffsreceivedinﬁnitelymany
periods do not matter, it must be that vnd
U (U,k)mU. This yields a contradiction.
In the discounted case, IR-in-every-state implies IR, but IR is typically weaker. To see
why IR does not imply IR-in-every-state, notice that, in the discounted case, the payoffs
in each period matter. It may happen that playerU agrees on a low-payoff action today
only because he counts on a reward tomorrow if player I turns out to be of type k. If
today’s action yields a payoff lower than mU and tomorrow’s continuation payoff given
type  k is equal to mU, then today’s discounted payoff given type  k is lower than mU.
Because the condition IR is usually less restrictive than IR-in-every-state in the dis-
counted case, one should expect that a larger set of proﬁles can be sustained as equilib-
ria in the discounted case.
3. Lower bound—finitely revealing equilibria
In this section, I characterize the sets of payoffs in ﬁnitely revealing equilibria. It is con-
venient to consider separately equilibria in which player I begins with a non-revealing
strategy (Section 3.1) and when she reveals some information (Section 3.2). In the last
part, I construct a lower bound FE on the correspondence of ﬁnitely revealing payoffs
FE.
3.1 Non-revealing strategies
Let v be the payoff in an equilibrium of the game  (p,) and let v(aU,aI) be the contin-
uation payoffs. Let 
U and 
k denote the ﬁrst period mixed action of playerU and type














k) for k =0,1.
(8)







U,ak) for k =0,1.
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If player I does not reveal any information in the ﬁrst period, then the posterior be-
liefsofplayerU donotchange. Thus, v(aU,aI)areequilibriumpayoffsinthegamewith
the same initial prior. Such payoffs can be analyzed using the self-generation technique
of Abreu et al. (1990) that is further extended in Fudenberg et al. (1994), Fudenberg and
Levine (1994), and Kandori and Matsushima (1998). It is convenient to solve the fol-
lowing problem. Recall that  2 R3 is the space of unit vectors in R3, and ﬁx  2 .
What is the highest possible value of v if, after any realized action proﬁle (aU,aI), the
continuation payoffs lie below a hyperplane  that passes through v,
 v(aU,aI) v? (10)
It cannot be larger than
(,p)=max
v




continuation payoffs v :SU SI !R3 so that
(1) equations (8) hold
(2) the incentive compatibility inequalities (9) hold
(3) payoff corrections are separated from the origin by
the hyperplane : inequalities (10) hold




There are two differences between the way that problem (11) is formulated and the
literature on games with imperfect monitoring. First, condition (4) requires that two
types of player I play the same strategies when the prior p is nondegenerate. This en-
sures that the actions of player I are non-revealing. Second, the continuation payoffs
depend only on the realized action of player I and not on the actions played by the two
types separately. However, the reader should not expect these to cause any major difﬁ-
culty. The ﬁrst simply imposes a constraint on the set of available strategies; the second
is dealt with in a way analogous to games with imperfect monitoring that fail identiﬁa-
bility (see, for example, Fudenberg and Levine 1994).
The next two results are proved in Section A of the Appendix.




fv : v (,k)gFE(k).
This result constructs equilibria in which playerU believes that he faces type k and
 v (,k) for each continuation payoff v and each .











FE(p). (12)42 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
This result constructs equilibria in which player I plays non-revealing strategies un-
til the continuation payoffs fall into the set A. After that, players follow the equilibrium
strategies associated with payoffs in A. If A consists of ﬁnitely revealing payoffs, then
such proﬁles are also ﬁnitely revealing equilibria. In any such equilibrium, the payoff
vector is equal to the convex combination of some v 2V and a 2A where the weight on
v depends on the expected time it takes to push the continuation payoff into A.
As mentioned above (Section 2.9), Proposition 1 has an exact equivalent in the no-
discounting literature. The situation is only slightly different with Proposition 2. When
p 2 (0,1), Hart (1985) shows that the set of equilibrium payoffs is convex and contained
in IR. That result looks like equation (12), but with V dropped. The difference is easy to
explain: in the discounted case, periods in which player I plays non-revealing actions
contribute to the total discounted payoffs.
3.2 Revelation of information
I now show how to construct payoffs in equilibria that begin with the revelation of in-
formation. Take any p0 < p1 and subsets of ﬁnitely revealing payoffs Apj  FE(pj) for


















2Apj for j =0,1
«
.
If the sets Apj are open and convex, then Ap is open and convex.
Proposition 3. If the sets Apj are open and convex, then Ap FE(p) for any p 2(p0,p1).
Proof. AssumethatthesetAp isnon-empty(otherwisethereisnothingtoprove). Take
v =(vU,v0,v1)2Ap. By the deﬁnition of Apj, there are payoff vectors
v j =(v
j














Because sets Ap0 and Ap1 are open and convex, and because of the deﬁnition of the
correspondence FE, there exist 0 and " >0 such that FE(p) contains a ball with center
at v j and radius 2": B(v j,2")  FE(p) for   0. Assume that 0 is high enough that
(1   0)M  ". (Recall that M is deﬁned in (1) as the uniform bound on stage game
payoffs.) I show that for all  0, B(v,")FE(p).
Find a proﬁle of mixed actions of player I, (0,1), so that each type randomizes
between all actions in such a way that the posterior after every action is equal to either
p0 or p1. Denote by S
j
I the set of actions after which the posterior is equal to pj. Then
SI = S0
I [S1
I. Take any mixed action U 2 SU of player U. Construct continuationTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Repeated games with incomplete information 43


















Then v(aU,aI) 2 B(v j,2"), so there exist ﬁnitely revealing continuation equilibria with
payoffs v(aU,aI). Hence v is a payoff in a ﬁnitely revealing equilibrium. 
3.3 Finitely revealing correspondence
Let F be the collection of all correspondences F  [0,1]  R3 such that F(p) 2 R3 is
closed for each p 2[0,1] and F satisﬁes the following properties.
FE-1 For any 2[0,1], p0 <p1, and (vk







FE-2 Ek  F(k) for k =0,1.
FE-3 con(F(p)[V)\IR F(p) for p 2(0,1).
All three properties correspond to the propositions above: FE-1 says that F contains
all payoffs in equilibria that start with revealing information and later continue with
payoffs in F; FE-2 insures that F contains all equilibrium payoffs in states 0 and 1; and
FE-3 says that F contains all payoffs in proﬁles that start with a non-revealing action
and later continue with payoffs in F.
Proposition 4. Thecorrespondence FE =
T
F2F
F(p)isclosedand FE 2F, i.e., itsatisﬁes
properties FE-1, FE-2, and FE-3. Moreover, if Assumption 1 holds, then
FE(p)clFE(p) for any p 2[0,1].
Proof. The fact that FE 2 F is immediate. In Section A.4 of the Appendix I show that
FE is closed. For any p 2[0,1], deﬁne
FE0(p)=clintFE(p).
InthesecondpartofSectionA.4,IshowthatFE0 2F. BythedeﬁnitionofFE,FE FE0.
This completes the proof. 
ThecorrespondenceFE isalowerboundonthesetofﬁnitelyrevealingequilibrium
payoffs. This bound is characterized purely in geometric terms. Notice that the set FE
is a function of the sets V and IR. Therefore any pair of stage games that have the same
minmax values and the same convex hull of non-revealing payoffs generate the same
sets FE.44 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
This is a good place to explain the role of Assumption 1. The assumption implies




U,v0,v1)2Ak for k =0,1
	
=projA1.
By Proposition 1, sets Ak are contained in the sets of equilibrium payoffs for p = k.
For each p 2 (0,1), let Ap be deﬁned as in the statement of Proposition 3. Then, Ap is
non-empty, open, and, by the above result, contained in FE(p)  clFE(p). (There is
a natural interpretation of the payoffs in Ap as those obtained by a single full revela-
tion of I’s type.) Hence, the assumption guarantees that for each p, the set FE(p) 
FE(p)  NE(p) has a non-empty interior. This plays the same role as the standard full-
dimensionality assumption in the complete information case. Open sets give enough
room to construct continuation payoffs with appropriate incentives.
4. Upper bound—ICR profiles
This section develops tools to bound the set of ICR payoffs. By Corollary 1, ICR(k)  Ek
for any k =0,1.
4.1 Separation with biafﬁne functions



















Then, for any " > 0, there is 0 < 1 such that for all   0, for any p 2 (0,1) and v =
(vU,v0,v1)2ICR(p),
vU l(p,v0,v1)+".
Moreover, if the inequality in (13) is reversed, then the following statement continues to
hold with the inequality also reversed.
Takeabiafﬁnefunctionl thatisaboveallICRpayoffsfordegeneratepriors,k 2f0,1g
(by Corollary 1, these payoffs are contained in the set Ek) and above the set of non-
revealingpayoffsV (eventhosenon-revealingpayoffsthatarenotindividuallyrational).
The proposition says that it is also above all ICR payoffs for any prior p 2[0,1].7
7Biafﬁne functions (or more generally, biconvex functions) were introduced in Aumann and Hart (1986)
to analyze bimartingales, which Hart (1985) used in his characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs
in the no-discounting case. In the no-discounting case, the thesis of Proposition 5 holds for any biafﬁne






1 ) 2 E, (13) is satisﬁed. In particular, it is not required
that l lie above (below) the set of non-revealing payoffs V. The proof in the no-discounting case is shorter
due to the bimartingale property.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Repeated games with incomplete information 45
Suppose that the thesis of the proposition does not hold, and that v is a payoff in
an ICR proﬁle such that vU  l (p,v0,v1)  " > 0. In the proof, I propose to measure the
information revealed by player I’s ﬁrst period action by a speciﬁc function denoted here
as Info. In particular, if, in the ﬁrst period, player I plays a non-revealing mixed action,
then Info=0. The proof of the proposition shows that there exists a continuation payoff
vector v(aU,aI) such that
vU(aU,aI) l(p,v0(aU,aI),v1v0(aU,aI))vU  l (p,v0,v1)+O(" Info). (14)
Here, O("  Info) is not smaller than a term proportional to "  Info. To see some intu-
ition, suppose that Info = 0, that is, player I plays a non-revealing action and the vector
of ﬁrst period payoffs belongs to V. Recall that v is a convex combination of the ﬁrst
period payoffs and the payoffs in the continuation ICR proﬁles in a game with the same
prior p. Because the ﬁrst-period payoffs belong to V and, by assumption, lie below the
biafﬁne function l , there must be at least one continuation payoff vector v(aU,aI) that
lies further from the biafﬁne function l than the original payoff vector. In fact, I can
bound how muchU’s continuation payoff moves away from l by a term that is propor-
tional to the distance between the original payoff ofU and l, which is of order " (with a
coefﬁcient of proportionality of order (1 ).)
Because of (14), the distance betweenU’s continuation payoff and the biafﬁne func-
tion l decreases only when player I reveals a substantial amount of information, and
increasesotherwise. However, informationcannotberevealedindeﬁnitely—atacertain
moment, player U learns the type of player I, and there is nothing more to reveal. But
this means that the distance betweenU’s payoffs and the biafﬁne function l must grow
to inﬁnity. This leads to a contradiction. Hence, it cannot be that vU  l(p,v0,v1)  ".
The proof of the proposition develops this intuition formally.
Proof of Proposition 5. Take any (p,v) 2 ICR such that p = 2 f0,1g. Let  =
(U,0,1) be a strategy proﬁle supporting v as an ICR payoff in the game  (p,). Let
U = U(;) be the ﬁrst period mixed action of player U, and k = k(;) be the ﬁrst pe-




I =suppI =supp0[supp1 bethesetofactionsthatplayer I playswithpositive
probability. After any action aI 2 S
I, player U updates his prior about the state of the





For any positive probability pair of actions aU 2 suppU and aI 2 S
I, the contin-
uation payoffs v(aU,aI) are payoffs in an ICR proﬁle. Let w(aU,aI) 2 R2 denote the






[vk  (1 )gk(U,aI) vk(U,aI)]. (15)46 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
If type k of player I plays action aI with positive probability (i.e., aI 2 suppk), then
vk(U,aI) = wk(U,aI); otherwise, vk(U,aI)  wk(U,aI). This follows from the IC
condition.




1 ) 2 Ek [V, vk
U < l (k,vk
0 ,vk
1 ). (The case of the reverse inequality is com-
pletely analogous.) I relegate two technical steps to the appendix. Section B.1 shows
that when  is sufﬁciently high, then, for any aI such that p(aI)2f0,1g,
vU(U,aI) l(p(aI),w(U,aI))<0. (16)


































The constant C depends on the payoffs in the stage game and on the biafﬁne function
































































































Hence, by (16), p(aI) 2 (0,1) and w (U,aI) = (v
0(U,aI),v
1(U,aI)). Together with
(18), this means that there exists an action aU 2SU such that v
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(Note that the above bound corresponds to (14) with Info(aI) = 4(C=")(p(aI))2  p2).)




































4.2 The ICR correspondence
Due to Proposition 5, one can use information about ICR payoffs in games with de-
generate priors p 2 f0,1g to derive a bound on the payoffs in games with p 2 (0,1).
The bound is not tight, and it can be tightened through a natural generalization. Sup-
pose that one has some information about ICR payoffs for some priors p0,p1, such that
p0 < p1. This information can be used to bound the sets of ICR payoffs ICR(p) for all
priors p 2(p0,p1). Let I be a collection of correspondences I [0,1]R3 such that
ICR-1 I(p)IR for p 2[0,1].
ICR-2 I(k) Ek for k =0,1.





















Then, for any 2(0,1) and any (vU,v0,v1)2 I(p1 +(1 )p0),
vU l (p1 +(1 )p0,v0,v1) (or vU l(p1 +(1 )p0,v0,v1)).
Property ICR-1 says that all payoffs are individually rational. Property ICR-2 says
that I(k) is contained in the set of equilibrium payoffs for degenerate priors k 2 f0,1g.
Properties 1 and 2 correspond to Corollary 1. Property 3 is a separation property. It
extends the thesis of Proposition 5 to cover cases when p0 >0 or p1 <1.
Proposition 6. The correspondence ICR = [I2I I is closed and ICR 2 I. Moreover,
ICRICR and ICR satisﬁes properties FE-1 and FE-3.
Proposition 6 deﬁnes a geometric upper bound ICR for the set of ICR payoffs. In
addition to properties ICR-1, ICR-2, and ICR-3, the proposition shows that the corre-
spondence ICR satisﬁes properties FE-1 and FE-3 (deﬁned in Section 3.3). The proof
of the proposition is based on the methods used in the proof Proposition 5 and can be
found in Section B.3.
Notice that conditions ICR-1, ICR-2, and ICR-3 that deﬁne the correspondence ICR
are stated in purely geometrical terms and that they depend only on the sets V and IR.
Thus, two games with the same convex hull of non-revealing payoffs and the same sets
of individually rational payoffs generate the same correspondence ICR. This remark
corresponds to an analogous observation about the correspondence FE.48 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
5. Proof of the main result
In the previous two sections, I construct correspondences FE and ICR. By Proposi-
tion 6, the correspondence ICR contains the correspondence ICR. If Assumption 1
is satisﬁed, Proposition 4 says that the correspondence FE is contained in the corre-
spondence clFE. Hence, Theorem 1 is a consequence of Propositions 4 and 6 and the
following result.
Theorem 3. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then for any p 2[0,1],
FE(p)=ICR(p).
The characterizations in Sections 3 and 4 derive two collections of geometric prop-
erties that are satisﬁed by the correspondences FE and ICR. These properties lead to
constraints on the inﬁnitesimal changes in FE(p) and ICR(p) with respect to inﬁnites-
imal changes of p. These constraints are different, but related. The idea of the proof
of Theorem 3 is to make use of these constraints and show that they can be satisﬁed by
only one correspondence. This is done through a “differential technique.” The rest is di-
vided into three parts. First, I describe the correspondences FE and ICR through their
upper and lower surfaces. It is sufﬁcient to show that the respective surfaces of the two
correspondences are equal. In the second part, I demonstrate that the upper surfaces of
the two correspondences are equal. The last part deals with lower surfaces.
5.1 Description of the correspondences FE* and ICR*
Deﬁne functions
u I,u F,l I,l F :[0,1]R2 !R[f 1,1g
in the following way. Let
u F(p)(v0,v1)=supfvU :(vU,v0,v1)2con[FE(p)[V]g
u I(p)(v0,v1)=supfvU :(vU,v0,v1)2con[ICR(p)[V]g
if the sets are not empty and  1 otherwise. For example, u I(p)(v0,v1)> 1 if and only
if (v0,v1) 2 projcon[ICR(p)[V]. The functions u I and u F describe the upper surfaces
of the correspondences ICR(p) and FE(p). Next, let
l F(p)(v0,v1)=inffvU :(vU,v0,v1)2con[FE(p)[V]g
l I(p)(v0,v1)=inffvU :(vU,v0,v1)2con[ICR(p)[V]g
if the sets are not empty and +1 otherwise. The functions l I,l F describe the lower
surfaces of the two correspondences. By property FE-3 of the correspondences FE and
ICR (Proposition 6), for each p 2[0,1],
FE(p)=fv 2IR:l F(p)(v0,v1)vU u F(p)(v0,v1)g
ICR(p)=fv 2IR:l I(p)(v0,v1)vU u I(p)(v0,v1)g.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Repeated games with incomplete information 49
Because FE ICR, it must be that
u F(p)(v0,v1)u I(p)(v0,v1) (19)
l I(p)(v0,v1)l F(p)(v0,v1). (20)
To prove Theorem 3, it is sufﬁcient to show that the inequalities (19) and (20) can be in
fact replaced by equalities.
The next lemma collects all the properties of the functions u I,u F,l I,l F that are
needed for the subsequent proofs.
Lemma 2. The functions u I,u F,l I,l F have the following properties.
(i) u F(k)(v0,v1)=u I(k)(v0,v1) and l F(k)(v0,v1)=l I(k)(v0,v1), for k =0,1.
(ii) u I and u F are concave in (v0,v1) and l I and l F are convex in (v0,v1).
(iii) u I is convex in p; u I is linear in p above the individually rational payoffs: if for
some p0 <p1 and (v0,v1)2projIR,
u I(pk)(v0,v1)mU, for k =0,1,








l I is concave in p.
(iv) u F is concave in p above the individually rational payoffs: if for some p0 < p1,
(v0,v1)2projIR,
u F(pk)(v0,v1)mU, for k =0,1,








l F is convex in p above the individually rational payoffs: if for some p0 < p1,
(v0,v1)2projIR,
l F(pk)(v0,v1)mU, for k =0,1,








Proof. Part (i) is a consequence of FE-2 and ICR-2. Part (ii) comes from the deﬁnitions
of the functions u I,u F,l I,l F. Part (iii) is a consequence of ICE-3 and Proposition 6
(the fact that ICR satisﬁes property FE-1). Part (iv) is implied by property FE-3 of the




projICR(p) (light blue) and






Figure 3. The sets projICR(p) for p 2[0,1].
Suppose that, instead of part (iv) of Lemma 2, its stronger version were true. More
precisely, supposethatthefunctionu F isknowntobeconcaveinp forall p and(v0,v1).
Because of (19), u F(p)  u I(p) for all p, and, because of part (i) of the lemma, u F(p) =
u I(p) for p = 0,1. Because of part (iii), u I and l I are convex in all p, which implies
that u F(p)=u I(p) for all p, and the correspondences ICR and FE are equal. Unfortu-
nately,thestrongerversionofpart(iv)ofthelemmaisnotgenerallytrue;thefactthatthe
functions u F and l F are known to be, respectively, concave and convex only above the
individually rational payoffs is the main source of difﬁculty of the proof of Theorem 3.
Observe that projICR(p) consists of all payoffs (v0,v1) at which the upper surface of
ICR lies above the individually rational payoffs, u I(p)(v0,v1)  mU. These sets play an
important role in the statement of the lemma. It is helpful to notice that they have some
monotonicity properties.
Lemma 3. For any p 2(0,1),
projICR(0)\projICR(1)projICR(p)projICR(0)[projICR(1).
For any p <p0,
projICR(p)\projICR(1)projICR(p0)\projICR(1),
projICR(p0)\projICR(0)projICR(p)\projICR(0).
By Corollary 1 and Proposition 1, projICR(k) = projEk for each k = 0,1. The
left and right graphs on Figure 3 present the projections of the payoffs in ICR(k) for
k = 0,1 on the set of player I’s payoffs (compare with Figure 2). For general p 2 [0,1],
the sets projICR(p) have the following monotonicity properties. First, projICR(p)
contains the intersection of, and is contained in the union of the sets projICR(0)
and projICR(1). Next, projICR(p) \ projICR(1) is (setwise) increasing in p and
projICR(p)\projICR(0) is (setwise) decreasing.
Proof of Lemma 3. Notice that (v0,v1)2projICR(p) if and only if (v0,v1)2projIR and
u I(p)(v0,v1)mU.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Repeated games with incomplete information 51
The ﬁrst inclusion is implied by property FE-1 of the correspondence ICR (Propo-
sition 6) and part (iii) of Lemma 2 (the linearity of u I in p over individually rational pay-
offs). Take any (v0,v1) = 2 projICR(k) for k = 0,1. Then u I(k)(v0,v1) < mU for k = 0,1.
By part (iii) of Lemma 2, u I(p)(v0,v1) < mU and (v0,v1) = 2 projICR(p). This implies the
second inclusion.






the distance between the upper surfaces of the correspondences ICR(p) and FE(p). If
k is identically equal to 0 for k = 0,1, then the upper surfaces of the correspondences
ICR(p) and FE(p) are equal. Next, I show that k is identically equal to 0.
5.2.1 Difference function For each k =0,1, deﬁne auxiliary correspondences
Ik(p)=fv 2ICR(p):u I(p)(v0,v1)=mU and (v0,v1)2projICR(k)g
F(p)=fv 2con(FE(p)[V):vU mUg.
The correspondence Ik(p) consists of payoff vectors on the upper surface of ICR(p),
for which player U’s payoff is equal to his minmax value and player I’s payoffs belong
to projICR(k) for k = 0,1. The correspondence F(p) consists of payoff vectors in the
convex hull of the sets FE(p) and V, and such that U’s payoff is not lower than the
minmax. Note that FE(p)  F(p), and the inclusion is typically strict, because the


















with the convention that 0=0 = 0 and a=0 = 1 for a > 0. The functions k measure the
distance between the correspondences ICR and FE. By part (i) of Lemma 2, for each
k =0,1,
k(0)=k(1)=0.
The next lemma shows that if the functions k are identically equal to 0, then the in-
equality in (19) can be replaced by an equality.
Lemma 4. Suppose that k(p) = 0 for each p = [0,1] and k = 0,1. Then u F(p)(v0,v1) =
u I(p)(v0,v1) for each p and each (v0,v1)2projICR(p).
Proof. I show that for any (v0,v1)2projICR(1)\projICR(p), we have u F(p)(v0,v1)=
u I(p)(v0,v1). For any (v0,v1)2projICR(1), deﬁne
p(v0,v1)=inffp :u I(p)(v0,v1)mUg.52 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Because u I(1)(v0,v1)  mU, p(v0,v1) is well deﬁned. I show that for any (v0,v1) 2
projICR(1),
u I(p(v0,v1))(v0,v1)=u F(p(v0,v1))(v0,v1)mU. (21)
If p(v0,v1) = 1, then (21) holds by part (i) of Lemma 2. If p(v0,v1) = 0, then the equality
in (21) holds by part (i) of Lemma 2 and the inequality comes from the convexity (hence,
upper semi-continuity) of u I in p. If 0 < p(v0,v1) < 1, then, by part (iii) of Lemma 2,





which, together with (19), implies (21).
Observe that
u I(1)(v0,v1)=u F(1)(v0,v1)mU for any (v0,v1)2projICR(1).
Because of (21) and parts (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 2, the inequalities in (19) can be re-
placed by equalities for any p 2[p(v0,v1),1].
An analogous argument shows that for any (v0,v1) 2 projICR(0) \ projICR(p),
u F(p)(v0,v1) = u I(p)(v0,v1). By the ﬁrst part of Lemma 3, projICR(p)  projICR(0)[
projICR(1). This concludes the proof of the lemma. 
Notice that for any (v0,v1) 2 R2, u I(p)(v0,v1) is either (a) equal to a convex combi-
nation of the form
u I(p)(v0,v1)=vV
U +(1 )u I(p)(v I
0,v I
1)
for some  2 [0,1], vV 2 V, and (v I
0,v I





1) = (v0,v1), or (b) equal to  1 if such a tuple of elements cannot be found.
Because
u F(p)(v0,v1)vV
U +(1 )u F(p)(v I
0,v I
1),
the previous lemma leads to the following result.
Corollary 2. Suppose that k(p) = 0 for each p = [0,1] and k = 0,1. Then we have
u F(p)(v0,v1)=u I(p)(v0,v1) for each p and each (v0,v1).
5.2.2 “Differential” step Here I show that k(p) = 0 for p 2 [0,1] and k = 0,1. Because
the arguments are exactly analogous, I assume without loss of generality that k = 1. To
save on notation, I also drop the subscript and write  instead of 1.
The next result is a crucial step in the proof.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Repeated games with incomplete information 53
Lemma 5. Suppose that (pu)=0 for some pu <1. There are constants D and d , >0,





for any p,p0 2[pu,
1
2(1+pu)] such that p p0 and p0  p <d .
Hence, (p0) is bounded by (p) plus a term that is of second order in (p) and
p0  p. The lemma is proved in Section C (in the Appendix).























m  d  for all i. Applying Lemma 5 once shows that (p1) 
D(
1








































Lemma 5 applies at each step because the choice of m implies that (pi)  . Since
any sequence of pi’s could have been chosen, it follows that for any p 2 [pu,
1
2(1+pu)],
(p) is not larger than 1=m times a constant. But, in turn, any large m could have been
chosen. This shows that (p)=0 for any p 2[pu,
1
2(1+pu)].
I use the lemma to prove that (p) = 0 for all p. Recall that (p) = 0 for p = 0,1.









n =1, and the above argument shows that (p)=0 for any p 2[0,1].
Together with Corollary 2, this means that the upper surfaces of ICR and FE are
equal.54 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
5.3 Lower surfaces
The goal of this section is to show that the lower surfaces of the two correspondences
are equal (that is, the inequality in (20) can be replaced by an equality).
For any p 2[0,1] and any (v0,v1), deﬁne
(p,v0,v1)=l F(p)(v0,v1) l I(p)(v0,v1),
where,asaconvention,Itake1 1=0. Thefunction measuresthedistancebetween
the lower surfaces of the two correspondences. Because of (20), (p,v0,v1)  0. Notice
thatl F(p)(v0,v1)<1 wheneveru F(p)(v0,v1)> 1. This isequivalent tou I(p)(v0,v1)>
 1,which,inturn,impliesthatl I(p)(v0,v1)<1. Hence,(p,v0,v1)isalwaysﬁniteand
bounded by 2M.
The proofs of the two lemmas below can be found in Section D (in the Appendix).























and suppose that  > 0. I show that this leads to a contradiction. Choose p 2 [0,1] and
(v0,v1) such that (p,v0,v1) 
1
2. Notice that p 2 (0,1). Alternating between the two
lemmas, I construct a sequence (pn,vn
0 ,vn










This yields the contradiction.
6. Comments and conclusion
An interesting application of the methods developed in this paper is present in unpub-
lished work by Gregory Pavlov, who studies repeated bargaining between a ﬁrm and a
union. The union is uncertain about the ﬁrm’s commitment to aggressive bargaining.
It turns out that the best equilibrium for the union involves a screening phase duringTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Repeated games with incomplete information 55
whichtheunionresortstostrikesandtheﬁrmrevealsinformationaboutitstypeﬁnitely
many times. When one interprets the discount factor converging to 1 as a division of
periods into smaller and smaller units, the length of the screening phase converges to a
positive constant. Pavlov uses differential equations to describe the set of equilibrium
payoffs.
The model of this paper has obvious limitations. For example, it is stated for only
two states of the world. When there are more than two states of the world, it is still pos-
sible to deﬁne ﬁnitely revealing equilibria and construct the correspondence FE as in
Proposition 4. One can also show an analog of Proposition 5. However, it is unclear how
to proceed further and prove that the two bounds are equal. In yet another extension,
one can relax the known-own-payoffs assumption.
Moreimportantly, thispaperisconcernedonlywithone-sidedincompleteinforma-
tion. I believe that it can serve as a step toward the characterization of payoffs in games
with multisided incomplete information. So far, that problem remains open.8
Appendix
A. Proofs for Section 3
A.1 Linear problem (11)
In order to solve the linear problem (11), it is convenient to introduce payoff correction
functions9 x :SU SI !R3. Let
x(aU,aI)=(g(aU,aI) v(aU,aI)).




vk  g j(
U,ak)+xk(
U,ak) for k =0,1,
with equalities when aU 2 supp
U and ak 2 supp
k. Similarly, (10) corresponds to
 x(aU,aI)0. The payoff corrections are used to characterize the function (.).
Lemma 8. (i) If either (a) k > 0 for some k =U,0,1 or (b) U < 0 and k < 0 for some
k =0,1, then (p,)maxv02V  v0. If p 2(0,1), then (p,)=maxv02V  v0.
(ii) If U = 1 and k =0, for k =0,1, then (p,)= mU.
(iii) If U =0 and for k =0,1, k 0, then (p,)= mI( 0, 1).
8In a recent paper, Athey and Bagwell (forthcoming) study a repeated Bertrand duopoly where each
ﬁrm has private information about its own costs. A speciﬁc structure of the game allows the authors to use
mechanism design tools to describe the optimal equilibria. It would be very interesting to check whether
the methods of this paper extend to their model.
9This representation is introduced in Kandori and Matsushima (1998). They refer to x(.,.) as a “sidepay-
ment contract.”56 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
(iv) If either (a) 0,1 > 0 or (b) U 6= 0 and for some k = 0,1,  k > 0, then (k,) =
1.
Proof. The proof consists of solving the linear problem (11) for each case separately.
The ﬁrst three parts are relatively standard and therefore omitted.




1 2SI, such that a
0 6=a
1. I enforce the proﬁle (a
U,a
0,a





1)=X1 for any large X1.
 Choose the payoff correction x1(aU,aI), (aU,aI)6=(a
U,a




1) small enough so that type 0’s incentive compatibility holds and
condition (10) is satisﬁed at the proﬁle (a
U,a









dition (10) is satisﬁed at the proﬁle (a
U,a1) (this can be done because 1 >0).
 Choose all other payoff corrections to make (10) satisﬁed for any other pair of
actions.




1 2SI, such that a
0 6=a
1. I enforce the proﬁle (a
U,a
0,a





1)=X1 for any large X1.
 Choose xU(aU,a
0), aU 6=a
U, so that playerU’s incentive compatibility holds.
 Choose x0(a
U,a0), a0 6=a






be done because U 6=0).
 Choose x1(a
U,a1), a1 6= a
1 small enough so that 1’s incentive compatibility holds
and condition (10) is satisﬁed at the proﬁle (a
U,a1) (this can be done because
1 >0).
 Choose all other payoff corrections for playersU and type 0.
 Choose x1(aU,aI), aU 6= a
U, to satisfy condition (10) at proﬁles (aU,aI) (this can
be done because 1 6=0). Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Repeated games with incomplete information 57
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1




fv : v (k,)g.
Proof. Suppose that k =0. Observe that
IR=
\
 satisﬁes cases (ii) and (iii)
from Lemma 8




 satisﬁes case (i) but not cases (ii)–(iv)
from Lemma 8
fv : v (0,)g.
Indeed, take any (v0
U,v0
0,v1















Suppose that  satisﬁes case (i) but not cases (ii)–(iv) and that 1 > 0. Then it must be









 v0 (0,). 




fv : v (k,)g.
(Note that the second inclusion holds by Lemma 9.) I show that there exists 0 such that
E is a set of equilibrium payoffs for any  0. Take any boundary vector of payoffs v 2
bdE and a vector  normal to E. For a high enough v, there is a mixed action proﬁle
(U,0,1)2SU SI SI and a continuation payoff function v :SU SI !intE so
that the payoffs v are supported by the proﬁle and the continuation payoffs (equations
(8)) and incentive compatibility hold (inequalities (9)). By the argument in Fudenberg
et al. (1994), for each v 2 E there is an open set U 3 v such that each   v, each
v0 2 E \v can be supported with an action proﬁle and continuation payoffs inside E
sothatincentivecompatibilityholds. IntheterminologyofFudenbergetal.(1994), E is
locally self-decomposable. Lemma 4.2 of Fudenberg et al. (1994) shows that E FE(k).58 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Assume without the loss of generality that A is convex (if not, then it is easy to use public
randomization to construct non-revealing equilibria with payoffs in conA). By Parts (i)–





 mU if U = 1,0 =1 =0
 mI( 0, 1) if 0,1 0,U =0
maxv02V  v0 otherwise.
Together with the deﬁnition of individually rational payoffs IR in (3), this implies that












In order to show the second inclusion, an intermediate result is needed.
Lemma 10. Suppose that A0  A is closed and convex with a nonempty interior and a
smooth boundary. Then for each v 2 int[con(A0 [V)\IR] there is " > 0 and a closed,
convex set W  IR with a nonempty interior and a smooth boundary such that v 2 W,
and for each v 2 bdW and  2  such that  is normal to W at v, either v 2 A0 or
 v (,p) ".
Proof. Instead of a complete argument, I present only the construction of the set W.



























The set W", consists of the elements of W" that are at least -far from the complement
of W"; the set W ", consists of the vectors that are at most -far from W",. Observe that
W ",  W", but the inclusion might be strict. It is easy to check that, for sufﬁciently
small " and , W ", is closed and convex, and has a nonempty interior and a smooth
boundary. It is easy to see that [",>0W", = int[con(A0 [ V) \ IR]. Because A0 has a
smooth boundary, when  is sufﬁciently small, A0  W ",. One can check that, for such
" and  and any v 2bdW ", nA0, if  is normal to W ", at v, then  v (,p) ". 
Take any v 2 int[con(A [V)\IR]. There exist 0 < 1 and closed, convex sets A0 and
A00 such that A0  intA00  A00  intA, v 2 int[con(A0 [ V) \ IR], and A00  FE(p) for
  0. By the previous lemma, there exists " > 0 and a closed, convex set W with a
nonempty interior and a smooth boundary such that v 2W and for each v 2bdW and
 2 such that  is normal to W at v, either v 2A0 or  v (,p) ".Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Repeated games with incomplete information 59
I show that there exists  0 such that W FE(p) for all  . More precisely, I
show that for each v 2 W, either (a) v 2 intA00, hence v is a payoff in a ﬁnitely revealing
equilibrium, or (b) v is supported by a proﬁle of mixed actions 
U, 
k,k =0,1, and con-
tinuation payoffs v(aU,aI) 2 W (equations (8)) such that incentive compatibility (in-
equalities (9)) holds. Using the argument for Lemma 4.2 of Fudenberg et al. (1994), one
can construct a strategy that makes v 2W a payoff in a ﬁnitely revealing equilibrium.
I show that (b) holds for any v 2W nintA00. By the deﬁnition of the function (,p),
there exists v <1 such that for each  v there is a proﬁle 
U,
k,k =0,1 and contin-
uation payoffs v(aU,aI)2intW so that equations (8) and inequalities (9) hold. Because
thecontinuationpayoffsv(aU,aI)belongtothe interiorofW, foreachv, onecanﬁnda
neighborhoodUv 3v suchthatv v0 foreachv0 2Uv. BecauseW nintA00 iscompact,
one can ﬁnd  0 such that for each   and each v 2W nintA00, there are a mixed
proﬁle and continuation payoffs so that (8) and (9) hold.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
This section contains the steps missing from the proof of Proposition 4.
A.4.1 FE* is closed Suppose not and there is (pn,vn) ! (p,v) with (pn,vn) 2 FE
and v = 2 FE(p). Without loss of generality I assume that pn > p for all n (taking a
subsequence might be necessary). Since FE(p) is closed and bounded (notice that
[ M,M]3 [0,1] 2 F) and satisﬁes property FE-3, there is a vector  = (U,0,1) 2 
such that U 6=0 and
 v > sup
v2FE(p)[V
 v =:x.
I assume without loss of generality that U >0 (the argument in the other case is analo-



















FE =f(p,v)2FE :if p p 1, then vU l(p,v0,v1)g.
Then for a high enough n, vn = 2 FE(pn). I show that FE satisﬁes properties FE-1,
FE-2, and FE-3. Because vn 2 FE(pn) and FE  FE, this implies that FE is not the
smallest set in the collection F, which contradicts the deﬁnition of FE.
It is immediate to check that FE has properties FE-2 and FE-3. I check that FE
satisﬁes property FE-1.
Lemma 11. Suppose F [0,1]R3 satisﬁes property FE-1. Suppose that there are p0 <p1
and a biafﬁne function l such that
vU l(pj,v0,v1) for each v 2 F(pj) and j =0,1.60 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Deﬁne
F =f(p,v)2 F :if p p 1, then vU l(p,v0,v1)g.
Then F satisﬁes property FE-1.
One can apply the lemma to the correspondence FE, priors p,1, and biafﬁne func-
tion l to conclude that FE satisﬁes FE-1.
Proof of Lemma 11. Take any p00 < p01 and (v
j






is afﬁne in p. Because F satisﬁes FE-1, then vp 2FE(p) for any p 2[p00,p01].
If p00,p01 2 [p0,p1], then v
j
U  l(p0j,v0,v1). The biafﬁnity of l implies that v
p
U 
l (p,v0,v1) for each p 2(p00,p01).
If p00 <p0 <p01 p1, then v1
U l (p01,v0,v1). Suppose that there is p 2(p0,p01) such
that v
p
U > l (p,v0,v1). Then it must be that v0
U > l (p00,v0,v1). Thus (A.1) is decreasing in
p. In particular, v
p0
U >l(p0,v0,v1). But this contradicts the thesis of the lemma.
If p00 < p0 < p1 < p01 and there is p 2 (p0,p1) such that v
p
U > l (p,v0,v1), then, for
at least one j, v
j
U > l (p0j,v0,v1). Suppose that j = 0. We have v1
U > l (p01,v0,v1), so
vpj >l(pj,v0,v1) for any j =0,1 (because (A.1) is afﬁne). If v1
U l(p01,v0,v1), then (A.1)
is decreasing in p and v
p0
U > l (p0,v0,v1). In each case, we get a contradiction to the
thesis of the lemma. 
A.4.2 FE0 2 F I need to check that FE0 satisﬁes properties FE-1, FE-2, and FE-3. As-
sumption 1 implies that for k = 0,1, the sets Ek have a non-empty interior. Because
Ek is convex, we have Ek = cl intEk and Ek  FE0(p) by Proposition 1. This establishes
FE-2. Proposition 2 implies FE-3:
FE0(p)=cl intFE(p)cl int[con(intFE0(p)[V)\IR]FE0(p).
ThusonlypropertyFE-1needstobeveriﬁed. RecallthatAssumption1togetherwith
Proposition 3 imply that there are non-empty, open, and convex sets Ap  intFE(p),
p 2[0,1], such that projAp =projAp0 for any p,p0 2[0,1].
Take p0 < p1 and v j = (v
j






p1  p0v0 2FE0(p). (A.2)






1 )2intFE(p j) such that v j,n !v j for j =0,1. I
have already established property FE-3; hence
con[fv j,ng[Ap j]intFE(p j) for each j,n.
A simple continuity argument shows that
intcon[fv jg[Ap j]FE0(p j),Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Repeated games with incomplete information 61
where intcon[fv jg [ Ap j] is non-empty, open, and convex. But this implies that se-
















 ! vp, this demonstrates (A.2).
B. Proofs for Section 4
B.1 Proof of property (16)
Suppose that p(aI)=0. There are open neighborhoodsUIR IR andUE  E F,IC(0) such
that for any (uU,u0,u1) 2 UIR \UE, uU < l (0,u0,u1). I show that for a high enough ,
(vU(U,aI),w(U,aI))2UIR \UE.





Hence for  high enough, (vU(U,aI),w(U,aI))2UIR.
Let 0 denote the strategy of player I that takes action aI in the ﬁrst period and then
follows with continuation strategy 0(aU,aI); let vU(U,0,0) denote the expected
payoff of player U when the two types of player I use the strategy 0. Recall that af-
ter observing aI, playerU is certain that he faces type 0. Hence the difference between
the expected payoffs vU(U,0,0) and the expected continuation payoffs vU(U,aI) is










Type 0 is indifferent between the strategies 0 and 0 because of condition IC.
Type 1 prefers to play 1; hence we have v(U,0,0)  v1. This implies that
(vU(U,0,0),v0,v1) 2 E
F,IC
0 . Together with (B.1) and (B.2), this implies that for  high
enough, (vU(U,aI),w(U,aI))2UE.
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Also, observe that kw(U,aI) (v0,v1)k2((1 )=)M.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Repeated games with incomplete information 63




















































































B.3 Proof of Proposition 6
It is easy to see that ICR 2I. The proof is divided into a few steps.
















U,v0,v1)2ICR(pj) for j =0,1 and p0 <p <p1
o
.
Then I satisﬁes FE-1. One easily checks that I satisﬁes properties ICR-1, ICR-2, and
ICR-3 and I 2I. Since I ICR, it must be that I =ICR.
B.3.2 ICR* satisﬁes FE-3 Deﬁne I [0,1]R3: for each p,
I(p)=con[ICR(p)[V]\IR.
Then I  ICR and I satisﬁes FE-3. I show that I 2 I. Conditions ICR-1 and ICR-2
hold by deﬁnition (notice that con(Ek [V)\IR = Ek for each k = 0,1). To see that the
separation property ICR-3 holds as well, suppose that p0 < p1 and there is a biafﬁne64 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)





















By property ICR-3 applied to the set ICR, for any p 2 (p0,p1) and any (vU,v0,v1) 2
ICR(p),
vU l(p,v0,v1). (B.5)
Therefore, inequality (B.5) holds also for any (vU,v0,v1)2con[ICR(p)[V]= I(p).
B.3.3 ICR* is closed I show that clI 2 I for any I 2 I. A simple continuity argu-
ment shows that ICR-1 and ICR-3 hold for clI. I show that (clI)(1)  E1 (the argu-
ment for (clI)(0) E0 is analogous). Suppose that there is (pn,vn
U,vn
0 ,vn










1) = 2 E1. Because (v
U,v
0,v




1) = 2 con(E1 [V). Because the sets E1 and V are bounded, there is  2 3






































Property ICR-3 applied to the set ICR implies that vn
U  l (pn,vn
0 ,vn
1 ) for all n. But this
















B.3.4 ICR* contains ICR payoffs Deﬁne the set I  [0,1]R3 as the smallest closed set
such that
(a) ICR I
(b) for any k 2f0,1g, Ek  I(k)Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Repeated games with incomplete information 65
(c) I satisﬁes FE-1 and FE-3.
The set I is well-deﬁned as the intersection of all closed sets with properties (a)–(c).
I show that I 2I, which implies that ICR I ICR.
Property ICR-1 holds by Corollary 1. The next two subsections establish properties
ICR-2 and ICR-3.
B.3.5 I satisﬁes property ICR-2. For each  2 3 and U 6= 0, for k = 0,1 deﬁne ck
 =










Then, I 0 is closed. Clearly, it satisﬁes properties (a), (b), and FE-3. Property FE-1 follows
from Proposition 5. For each k = 0,1, I 0(k)  Ek. Also, by deﬁnition, I  I 0. Hence, for
k =0,1, I(k) I 0(k) Ek.
B.3.6 I satisﬁes property ICR-3. I show that the correspondence I satisﬁes ICR-3 with
inequality “<” (the other case is analogous). I start with a lemma.
Lemma 12. Suppose that for each p0 <p1 and biafﬁne function l , if
vU l (pj,v0,v1) for each v 2 I(pj)[V and j =0,1,
then vU  l (p,v0,v1) for each v 2 ICR(p) and p 2 (p0,p1). Then the correspondence I
satisﬁes property ICR-3.
Proof. Supposetothecontrarythattherearep0 <p1,abiafﬁnefunctionl ,p 2(p0,p1),






1) for each v j 2 I(pj)[V and vU > l (p,v0,v1).
Deﬁne I 0 [0,1]R3 by
I 0 =f(p,vU,v0,v1)2 I :if p0 p p1, then vU l (p,v0,v1)g.
Then, I 0   I and I 0 is closed. By the hypothesis of the lemma, I 0 satisﬁes property (a).
Clearly, I 0 satisﬁes property (b) and FE-3. An application of Lemma 11 shows that I 0
satisﬁes property FE-1. But this contradicts the deﬁnition of I as the smallest closed set
that satisﬁes properties (a)–(c). 
Therefore, if I violates ICR-3, then there are " > 0, p0 < p < p1, a biafﬁne function
l, and v 2 ICR(p) such that v
j




1) for each v j 2 I(pj)[V and j = 0,1, and
vU l (p,v0,v1)+11". Choose sequences n !1 and (pn,vn
U,vn
0 ,vn
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proﬁle of ﬁrst-period mixed actions, let vn(aU,aI) be the continuation payoffs, and let
pn(aI)betheposteriorbeliefs(posteriorsarewell-deﬁnedonlyaftertheactionisplayed









These continuation payoffs would make the two types of player I indifferent between










U,aI), if pn(aI)2(0,1)[fkg. (B.8)
I show below (Section B.3.7) that for all sufﬁciently high n, if aI is played with positive








The proof is concluded in the same way as the proof of Proposition 5. As in Sec-
tion B.2, one can show that for a high enough , inequality (17) holds for any ICR payoff
(vU,v0,v1) 2 ICR(p), p0 < p < p1, such that vU  l (p,v0,v1)  ". In particular, there is





































isacontinuationICRpayoffforallaU playedbyU withpositiveprobability. Hencethere

























and pn(aI) 2 (p0,p1). But this contradicts the choice of (pn,vn
U,vn
0 ,vn
1 ) as the maximiz-
ers of expression (B.6).
B.3.7 (B.9)issatisﬁedforahighenoughn Supposenot. ThenonecanﬁndanactionaI
andsubsequences(denotedfurtherasasequenceofns)suchthataI isplayedwithpos-
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Assume without loss of generality that p(aI)  p0 < 1 (the other case, p(aI)  p1, is




1 )k  2M(1 n)=n for













Proof. Suppose ﬁrst that p(aI) > 0. Because p(aI) < 1, this means that for sufﬁ-







U,aI)) is a convex combination of payoffs in ICR proﬁles.
Moreover, each type of player I has to be indifferent between aI and any other equilib-
rium action. Because the ﬁrst-period payoffs from playing aI converge to 0 when n !
1, this means that limn!1vn
k (n
U,aI)=v























U,(aI,0)) denote the vector of expected payoffs if player I chose aI in the
ﬁrst period and then mimicked the strategy 0 of type 0 (the expectation is taken with
respect to the mixed action n
U of playerU). Observe that vn(n


























Let ¯ v = limn!1vn(n
U,(aI,0)) 2 V (note that the limit exists, possibly after taking





0, and ¯ v
1  v


















Observe that ¯ v 2 I(p0) because p(aI)  p0 < p and because of the above lemma, the
fact that v 2 I(p), p(aI)  p0 < p, and the fact that the correspondence I satisﬁes
property FE-1. By the choice of a biafﬁne function l, ¯ vU  l(p0, ¯ v0, ¯ v1). However, notice68 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
that





















The contradiction shows that for a high enough n, if pn(aI)  p0 or pn(aI)  p1, then
(B.9) must hold. This ends the proof of the proposition.
C. Proof of Lemma 5
ThissectionisdevotedtotheproofofLemma5. SectionC.1provessomegeometricalre-
sults. Section C.2 deﬁnes all the constants and states a helpful assumption. Section C.3
proves the lemma given the assumption. Sections C.4 and C.5 ﬁll in some missing steps.
SectionC.6 showshowto extendTheorem3 togamesthat donotsatisfy theassumption
in Section C.2.
C.1 Geometrical results
Suppose that A  R2 is a (not necessarily bounded) set with ﬁnitely many extreme
points Aextr  A. Then there exists a ﬁnite set of unitary vectors A  2 such that
A =
T
2Afa 2R2 : a supa02A  a0g.
Lemma 14. Suppose that A  R2 is a (not necessarily bounded) set with ﬁnitely many
extreme points Aextr A. Suppose that B R2 is a ﬁnite set such that A\conB =?. Then
there is a constant CB <1 such that for any a 2A, if
A \con(B [fag)=fag, (C.1)






Proof. Given the assumptions about the sets A and B, there is a ﬁnite set 
B  2 of




 a0 = a <min
b2B
 b.
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It is easy to check that 
B has the required property.













 a0]+(1 )[ a  sup
a02A
 a].
By the remark above, there exists  2 
B so that the ﬁrst term in the last line of the
inequality is strictly positive and the second term is equal to 0. For such ,

1










minb02B  b0  supa02A  a0.
This constant is well-deﬁned, as a maximum over ﬁnitely many ﬁnite constants. 
Say that v 2 R3 is represented by tuple (v,,), v 2 R3, 2 [0,1],  2 B, where





Lemma 15. Suppose that v is represented by ( ¯ v,,) for some 2(0,1). Then there is an
open neighborhood U 3 ¯ v such that for any ¯ v0 2U \con(supp [f ¯ vg) , v is represented
by ( ¯ v0,0,0) for some 0 < and 0 2(supp).










00(v) for each v 2supp.
«
.
Then ¯ v 2UV and UV is open relative to con(supp [f ¯ vg). Hence, there exists an open
setU R3 such thatUV =U \con(supp[f ¯ vg).
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Then 0 2(supp) is a probability measure with support contained in supp and



















C.2 Assumption and constants
ThroughoutSectionsC.3,C.4,andC.5oftheAppendixImakethefollowingassumption.






The assumption is restrictive. Initially, I prove that Lemma 5 holds for all games that
satisfy the assumption. Together with the analysis of Section 5, this demonstrates The-
orem 3 for all games satisfying the assumption. In Section C.6 I extend Theorem 3 to all
games.
Deﬁne the closed sets
V + =V \fv :vU mUg and V   =V \fv :vU mUg.
Both sets are convex and spanned by ﬁnitely many vertices. Let V +
vert and V  
vert consist of
the vertices of, respectively, V + and V  . Let
V  =V +
vert [V  
vert.
Then V  is ﬁnite. Let B be the set of all ﬁnite subsets of projV   R2 such that conB \
projIR = ?. For any B 2 B, let CB be the constant from Lemma 14 applied to the set
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Observe that for each IR,S() is spanned by a ﬁnite set of verticesSvert(). Deﬁne
CI =mU   max
IR
fvU :(vU,v0,v1)2Svert(),vU <mUg>0. (C.3)


















The constant L is ﬁnite because the set ICR(1) = E1 is the convex hull of ﬁnitely many
vertices.





































C.3 Proof of Lemma 5 (given Assumption 2)
In order to shorten the notation, I write v0,1 = (v0,v1) 2 R2 for any v = (vU,v0,v1) 2 R3.
Assume that the hypothesis of Lemma 5 is satisﬁed and, in particular,
p0  p d  and (p).
Denote
 =(p).












This establishes (22) and the lemma.
The main objective of the proof is to bound the distances between a number of
payoff vectors. It is helpful to list all the variables involved, together with the rela-
tionships between them. There are two types of payoff vectors: for those associated
with prior beliefs p, I write xI,xI,a,xF,a 2 R3, and for those associated with p0, I write
y I,y I,a,y F,y F,a 2R3. The following hold:
xA
0,1 =y A
0,1 for any A = I,(I,a),F,(F,a)
xI =Iv I +(1 I)xI,a
y I =Iv I +(1 I)y I,a
y F =Fv I +(1 F)y F,a72 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
for some v I 2V and I,F 2[0,1].
Therestoftheproofisdividedintosixsteps. AllconstantsaredeﬁnedinSectionC.2.
Lemmas 16 and 17 are proved in Sections C.4 and C.5, respectively.
Step 1. Deﬁne xI = (u I(p)(y I
0,1),y I




U =u I(p)(y I
0,1)mU; (C.8)
otherwise, by part (iii) of Lemma 2, u I(p0)(y I
0,1)>mU, which contradicts y I 2 I1(p0).
Lemma 16. There exist xI,a 2 I1(p), I 2[0,1], and v I 2V such that v I mU  CI and
xI =Iv I +(1 I)xI,a.
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where the equality in the second line comes from (C.10).























(Recall the deﬁnition of the constant C0 in (C.5).) For p0   p  d   1=C0, we have
(1 
1
2C0(p0  p)) 1 (1+C0(p0  p)). Hence
u I(1)(x
I,a
0,1 ) mU (1+C0(p0  p))(u I(1)(y I
0,1) mU). (C.13)


























0,1 ) mU)(p0  p)mU, (C.15)
where the last inequality holds for   (1 pu)=C0.
Deﬁne payoff vectors





y F():=v I +(1 )y F,a.







0,1 ) mU)(p0  p)+(1 p)(mU  v I
U)
. (C.16)










(Notice that (x  a)=(x  b) is increasing in x for a <b.) Therefore,
y F()2 F(p) for each F.74 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)













M(p0  p)+(1 p)(mU  v I
U)
.
For p0  p d  (1 pu)CI=(2LM),



































( +p0  p)(u I(1)(xI
0,1) mU),
where the constant D is deﬁned in equation (C.6).
Step 6. Compute the distance between y I











































Steps 4 and 5, inequality (C.14), and the last inequality imply that one can ﬁnd F so
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C.4 Proof of Lemma 16
The proof of the lemma is divided into two parts.







U =mU, and vU mU  CI for each v 2suppI.
Any tuple (xI,a,I,v I) such thatxI,a 2ICR(p), I 2[0,1], I 2V, and (C.17) holds
is called a representation of xI.
Proof. There exists at least one representation (x,,) of xI 2 con(ICR(p) [ V).
Among all such representations, choose (xI,a,I,) to minimize I. Such a represen-
tation exists by a simple compactness argument.
I show that x
I,a
U =mU. Consider the following three cases.
1. If I =0, then mU x
I,a
U =xI
U mU by (C.8).
2. Suppose that 0<I <1. If x
I,a












U  mU. Because xI
0,1,x
I,a
0,1 2 projIR, we have x
I,a0
0,1 2 projIR.
Hence xI,a0 2 IR and there is 0 < I such that (xI,a0,0,) is a representation of
xI. Thiscontradictsthechoiceof(xI,a,I,)astherepresentationthatminimizes
I.
3. If I =1, then any xI,a 2 I1(p) satisﬁes (C.17).
Recall the deﬁnition of CI and the set Svert(0), where 0  IR. (These deﬁnitions











Then v 2conS and there exists I 2S such that (C.17) holds.
I show that for each v 2 suppI, vU < mU. By the deﬁnition of the constant CI in
(C.3), this implies that for each v 2 suppI, vU < mU  CI. On the contrary, suppose
that there is v 2suppI with vU mU. There are two cases to be considered.76 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
1. If there is  2 IR such that  x
I,a
0,1 = mI() and   v0,1 < mI(), then, by the
deﬁnition of the setS(I),  v













0,1 = y I
0,1 2 projIR. Hence (C.18) contradicts the fact that (xI,a,I,v)
is a representation of xI.
2. Next, suppose that v0,1 mI() for any  2IR such that x
I,a
0,1 =mI(). This












U )  mU. One concludes
that for small " >0,
xI,a0 =xI,a +"(v  xI,a)2IR.
But then, by Lemma 15, there is a representation (xI,a0,I0,v) such that I0 <I.
This contradicts the choice of (xI,a,I,v) as the representation that minimizes
I. 
Lemma 19. xI,a 2 I1(p).
Proof. I need to show that
u I(p)(x
I,a
0,1 )=mU, and x
I,a
0,1 2projICR(1). (C.19)
First, suppose that the ﬁrst part of (C.19) is not true. Because x
I,a












Because (xI,a,,) is a representation of xI, x0,1 =xI
0,1. By the above equation, we have
u I(p)(xI
0,1)xU >xI
U. But this contradicts (C.8).
















where the last inequality follows from the fact that vU  mU  CI for each v 2 suppI.
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The function u I(.)(xI




























0,1 = 2projICR(1), or, because x
I,a











Subtract both sides of (C.21) from the corresponding sides of (C.20) and multiply by





Therefore, if p0  p < LM=(CI(1 pu)), then
x
I,a
0,1 2projICR(1) and xI,a 2 I1(p). 
C.5 Proof of Lemma 17














A tuple (x,F,F) such that x 2 FE(p), F 2 [0,1], F 2 V, and (C.22) holds is
called an F-representation of xF,a.






(The sets V +
vert [V  









The lemma is a consequence of the deﬁnition of the constant CF in equation (C.2).78 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Recall that xF,a 2 F(p), which implies that x
F,a
U  mU. If xF,a 2 IR, then xF,a 2
FE(p), and the lemma is trivially true. From now on, assume that xF,a = 2 IR. There
exists at least one representation (x0,F,) of xF,a such that (C.22) holds. Among all
representations, choose the one with the lowest value of F and denote it by (x,F,).








U  mU, then v 2 V   = conV
_
vert and there is a representation (x,F,F) so that
suppF  V
_
vert. Similarly, if v

U  mU, then there is a representation (x,F,F) so that
suppF V +
vert.
I discuss separately the different cases.
Case F = 1. There is no representation such that F < 1. I can assume that
suppF V +










If not, then there exists v 2 con(suppF)\IR  V \IR. Because suppF  V +
vert, it must
be that vU  mU and v 2 FE(p). A simple geometric argument shows that for any
v0 2 intcon(suppF), there is a representation (v,F0,0) with F 0 < 1. Because xF,a 2
intcon(suppF), this leads to a contradiction.
Because F = 1, equation (C.22) is satisﬁed by any any x 2 FE(p). Choose x so that
con(suppF [fxg)\IR=fxg. Such a value of x exists by (C.24).
Because for each v 2 suppF, vU  mU, the above argument implies that (C.23)
holds.
Case 0 < F < 1 and xU > mU. By Lemma 15 and the choice of F, there is an open






There is an open neighborhoodU0 3x such that x0
U >mU for any x0 2U0. Hence
U0 \fx0 :x0
0,1 2projIRgFE(p).







Suppose that condition (C.23) does not hold and there is v 2 R3 such that (v0,v1) 2
projIR and either v 2consuppF or v 2con(suppF [fxg)nfxg. Then, for small ,
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Case 0 < F < 1 and xU = mU. By Lemma 15 and the choice of F, there is an open




U mU, it must be that v mU and suppF V +
vert. This implies that
con(suppF [fxg)\fx0 :x0
0,1 2projIRgFE(p).
These two observations imply that
U \con(suppF [fxg)\fx0 :x0
0,1 2projIRg=?.
The same argument as in the previous case shows that condition (C.23) must hold. 













where in the second inequality I use (C.14). Denote v =
P
v2V v(v).
By the deﬁnition of L in equation (C.4),
u F(1)(x
I,a




































where in the last inequality I use (C.14). For sufﬁciently small   =1=L(1+MCF),
u F(1)(x0,1) mU (u I(1)(x
I,a
0,1 ) mU)(1 L(1+MCF))0.
By part (iii) of Lemma 2, the function u I(p0)(x
I,a























where I use the fact that xI,a 2 I1(p) and u I(p)(x
I,a
0,1 ) = mU. By Lemma 2, the function
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Recall that xF,a 2 F(p), hence mU  x
F,a
















u F(1)(x0,1) F p0  p
1 p
2M. (C.28)




















The lemma follows from the deﬁnition of C0 in equation (C.5).
C.6 Approximation argument
So far, I have shown that Theorem 3 is true if Assumption 2 holds. Here I argue that
Assumption 2 is unnecessary. The idea is that any game can be approximated by games
that satisfy Assumption 2.
Recall that the correspondences FE and ICR are deﬁned as functions of the sets
V of non-revealing payoffs and IR of individually rational payoffs. Precisely, consider
two collections of closed subsets of [ M,M]3: V consisting of all convex sets and IR
consisting of all convex sets with the property that for any IR2IR there is mU 2R such
that for any (vU,v0,v1) 2 IR, (v0
U,v0
0,v0
1) 2 IR if v0
k  vk and v0
U  mU. For any V 2 V and
IR2IR,deﬁnesets Ek(V,IR)asinequations(6)and(5). Usingthesets Ek,Imayrestate
Assumption 1: it holds if there are two open sets Ak  Ek such that projA0 = projA1.
This allows me to deﬁne correspondences FE(V,IR) and ICR(V,IR) as in Sections 3.3
and 4.2.
Theorem 3 can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that Assumption 1 (as stated in
this section) holds for some V 2V and IR2IR. Then FE(V,IR)=ICR(V,IR). Till now,
I have shown that Theorem 1 is true, if, in addition, Assumption 2 is satisﬁed.
Suppose now that Assumption 1 holds for some V 2 V and IR 2 IR. Consider an
approximatingsequenceofclosedsetsIRn 2IR,suchthatAssumption2issatisﬁedfor
all sets in the sequence, IRn  IR, and IRn converges to the set IR in the sense of Hauss-
dorf distance: limn!1IRn = IR. Such a sequence clearly exists. Then Assumption 1
holds for a high enough n and
FE(V,IRn)=ICR(V,IRn).
By monotonicity, FE(V,IRn)FE(V,IR) for all n. Two simple lemmas end the proof.
Lemma 21. limn!1FE(V,IRn)=FE(V,IR).
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Lemma 22. limn!1ICR(V,IRn)=ICR(V,IR).
Proof. Indeed, deﬁne the correspondence ICR
n for any p 2[0,1] by
ICR
n (p)=IRn \ICR(V,IR)(p)
and show that it satisﬁes all three properties in Section 4.2. As a consequence, ICR
n 
ICR(V,IRn). 
D. Proofs for Section 5.3
I need the following auxiliary result.









Suppose that the inequality is strict, and deﬁne
v




U,v0,v1) 2 FE(p). By part (iv) of Lemma 2, for any n and any pm 2 [p,pn]
















This creates a contradiction. 
D.1 Proof of Lemma 6
If l F(p)(v0,v1)  mU +
1
















with the convention that p0 =0 or p1 =1 if the respective sets are empty. Then p0 <p <
p1, and because of Lemma 23,
l F(pi)(v0,v1)mU +
1
2(pi,v0,v1) for i =0,1.82 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Bypart(iv)ofLemma2, l F isconvex(hencecontinuousforinteriorps)abovemU. Thus









This means that there is p0 2fp0,p1g such that
(p0,v0,v1)(p,v0,v1)>0.








D.2 Proof of Lemma 7
By the deﬁnition of the function l I, there is v0 = (v0
U,v0
0,v0
1) 2 ICR(p),  2 [0,1], and




U and l I(p)(v0,v1)= ¯ vU +(1 )v0
U. (D.1)
Because v0
U  mU, it must be that v0
U  l I(p)(v0,v1) 
1
2(p,v0,v1). Because v0
U   ¯ vU 










Because ¯ v 2con(FE(p)[V),
l F(p)( ¯ v0, ¯ v1) ¯ vU =l I(p)( ¯ v0, ¯ v1)l F(p)( ¯ v0, ¯ v1)
and all the inequalities can be replaced by equalities. In particular,
(p, ¯ v0, ¯ v1)=0.
By the convexity of l F in (v0,v1) (part (ii) of Lemma 2),
l F(p)(v0,v1)l F(p)( ¯ v0, ¯ v1)+(1 )l F(p)(v0
0,v0
1)
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